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AbstRAct
Every country faces an intertemporal budget constraint, which requires that its 
government’s future expenditures, including servicing its outstanding official debt, 
be covered by its government’s future receipts when measured in present value. 
The present value difference between a country’s future expenditures and its future 
receipts is its fiscal gap. The US fiscal gap now stands at $205 trillion. This is 10.3 
percent of the estimated present value of all future US GDP. The United States 
needs to raise taxes, cut spending, or engage in a combination of these policies by 
an amount equal to 10.3 percent of annual GDP to close its fiscal gap. Closing the gap 
via raising taxes would require an immediate and permanent 57 percent increase 
in all federal taxes. Closing the gap via spending cuts (apart from servicing official 
debt) would require an immediate and permanent 37 percent reduction in spending. 
This grave picture of America’s fiscal position effectively constitutes a declaration 
of bankruptcy.
JEL codes: H2, H5, H6
Keywords: fiscal gap, fiscal policy, generational equity, taxes, deficits, federal 




A country’s fiscal sustainability matters. It matters to a country’s growth path, 
to its future tax rates, to its saving behavior, to its net domestic investment, to its 
labor supply, to its inflation rate, to its employment, to its wages, to its returns on 
capital, to the integrity of its financial markets, to the viability of its political institu-
tions—indeed, it matters to virtually any question one might pose about a country’s 
economic future.
Fiscal sustainability also raises ethical questions. If a country is spending more 
than it can cover with its current and future taxes, will the unpaid bills be left for 
today’s and tomorrow’s children? More precisely, will current adults, particularly 
current retirees, escape the requisite fiscal adjustment because the adjustment 
starts when they are at the end of life or, indeed, after they have died?
In order to understand what a generationally fair means of achieving fiscal sus-
tainability would be, we must first understand what overall adjustment is needed 
and how much more particular generations will pay if other generations pay less. 
Fiscal gap accounting tells us what overall adjustment is required, and genera-
tional accounting examines the impact that achieving fiscal sustainability has on 
particular generations.
Described in this manner, fiscal gap and generational accounting sound like the 
analysis of a zero-sum game in which changes in policy that benefit one generation 
must necessarily hurt another. That’s not the case. There may be investments, for 
example, in education, research, infrastructure, technology, and communications, 
whose costs are more than offset by future revenues thanks to their positive impact 
on the economy. But fiscal gap and generational accounting provide frameworks for 
governments to soberly evaluate whether an investment that generation X is forced 
to make via the fiscal system will actually pay for itself through time or, instead, 
represent an added burden that current and future generations must bear.
An example is investment in clean energy financed by borrowing from current 
generations. If future generations are asked to repay this borrowing but the invest-
ment provides sufficient benefits in terms of abating climate change, that future 
generation may, on balance, end up better off.
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the FiscAl gAp
Every country faces what economists call an intertemporal (across time) bud-
get constraint, which requires that its government’s future expenditures, including 
the servicing of its outstanding official debt, be covered by its government’s future 
receipts when measured in present value. The difference between the present value 
of a country’s future expenditures and its future receipts is called its fiscal gap.1
No household can continually spend more than it makes. At some point, those 
who are financing the excess of the household’s expenditures over its receipts 
will declare “game over.” The same is true of governments. Eventually they need 
to change their spending or their revenues or both in order to satisfy their inter-
temporal budget. The longer the delay in adjusting policy, the bigger and more 
painful the adjustment will be and the greater will be the burden on the young and 
future generations.
A country’s fiscal gap measures the size of its intertemporal budget imbalance 
based on its current and intended future course of fiscal policy. Countries whose 
prevailing policies produce fiscal gaps are running policies that are unsustainable. 
And the size of the country’s fiscal gap indicates the degree to which taxes need 
to be raised, spending needs to be cut, or a combination of tax hikes and spending 
cuts needs to be imposed, either immediately or over time, to achieve a sustain-
able policy.2
Using the United States as an example, this article discusses fiscal sustainability 
and the economic fallout from not running a sustainable fiscal policy. The US fiscal 
gap now stands at an estimated $205 trillion.3 This is 10.3 percent of the estimated 
present value of all future US GDP. Stated differently, the United States needs to 
either raise taxes or cut spending or engage in a combination of these policies by 
an amount equal to 10.3 percent of annual GDP to close its fiscal gap. Doing so via 
taxes would require an immediate and permanent 57 percent increase in all federal 
1. The present value of the servicing of official debt equals the current market value of official debt net 
of financial assets. The federal government does possess significant assets. However, those assets that 
can easily be sold amount to only a tiny fraction of the fiscal gap. Political considerations are unlikely to 
result in significant sales of other assets such as mineral rights and national parks.
2. There are some economists who believe the government has no need to pay for what it spends. Some 
believe the government can spend more and that the increased spending will so stimulate the economy as 
to pay for itself. Others believe the government can cut taxes and pay for the tax cuts via induced growth. 
Yet others think the government can print as much money as it wishes to pay for what it spends. Would 
that these beliefs in economic magic were true. We would never see governments default on their debts 
or run hyperinflations. But economic history is replete with examples of countries that ran into trouble 
by pretending their governments had magic wands that could make their fiscal gap disappear.
3. Apportioning the fiscal gap to particular policies, such as Social Security or Medicare or defense, is a 
hopeless task. A dollar is a dollar, and there is no economic basis for allocating particular taxes to this or 
that expenditure. For example, the Social Security FICA tax could just as well be described as funding 
future defense spending as funding future Social Security benefits. State and local governments also have 
fiscal gaps measured as present value. They are not included in the federal $205 trillion, but my estimate 
is that they exceed $30 trillion in total.
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taxes.4 Doing so via spending cuts (apart from servicing official debt) would require 
an immediate and permanent 37 percent reduction in spending.
This startling and grave picture of America’s fiscal position could effectively con-
stitute a declaration of bankruptcy. But no one on Pennsylvania Avenue or on Wall 
Street would openly declare the United States to be broke. The question is, Why not?
oFFiciAl debt vs. the FiscAl gAp
The answer is that the media, Wall Street, the politicians, the general public, and 
indeed, most economists are looking almost exclusively at the wrong measure of 
fiscal sustainability, namely the $12 trillion in official debt held by the public. This 
figure is substantial on its own, but it’s not even three-quarters of our $17 trillion 
GDP. Compared, say, with Greece, which has a debt-to-GDP ratio of 1.7, the US 
official debt appears to be a problem but not a grave concern. The reality, though, 
is that the US official debt is just 6 percent of our government’s true credit card 
bill—its fiscal gap.
WhAt MAKes the us oFFiciAl debt “oFFiciAl”?
The official debt only includes what’s recorded as official liabilities. But, as 
shown in my paper with Jerry Green, there is no economic basis—nothing in neo-
classical economic theory, that is, in the mathematics of economic models—that tells 
us what should be recorded as official borrowing and put on the books and what 
should not be recorded as official borrowing and be left off the books.5
Take our contributions to Social Security. The government calls them “FICA 
taxes” and promises us future “transfer payments” in exchange, which it references 
as “Social Security benefits.” But the government could just as well call our contri-
butions “borrowing” and call our future benefits “return of principal plus interest” 
on this borrowing.6
Had the government used this alternative set of words to classify Social Security 
receipts and outlays, the official debt today would be $25 trillion larger than cur-
rently reported. This is the Social Security system’s unfunded liability presented in 
4. If the tax hikes eroded the various federal tax bases, marginal and average tax rates would have to rise 
even further, potentially leaving the United States with the highest tax rates of any developed country.
5. Jerry Green and Laurence Kotlikoff, “On the General Relativity of Fiscal Language,” in Key Issues 
in Public Finance: A Conference in Memory of David Bradford, ed. Alan J. Auerbach and Daniel Shaviro 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
6. If the benefits exceed (or fall short of) principal plus interest, the difference can be labeled a Social 
Security bonus (or tax).
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table IV.B6 of the 2013 Social Security Trustees Report.7 Adding $23 trillion to $12 
trillion and properly accounting for the $2.6 trillion of Social Security trust fund 
assets8 would put our official debt at over $37 trillion or more than twice GDP—
higher than Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio!9
So why not call the US official debt $37 trillion rather than $12 trillion? Ours is a 
free country. Each of us is free to use his or her own internally consistent labeling 
convention in describing past and, for that matter, current and future, projected 
government receipts and payments. But if we can all come up with our own measure 
of official debt, which one should we use?
The answer is there is no answer. We can construct an infinite number of differ-
ent official debt numbers and none will be any better than the others in describing 
our fiscal policy. The reason is simple: The official debt doesn’t measure anything 
economic. It’s purely a linguistic construct. The same holds for other conventional 
fiscal indicators, including the deficit (the annual change in the debt), aggregate 
taxes, aggregate transfer payments, disposable income, private savings, personal 
savings, private wealth, and government wealth.
Since these fiscal measures occupy roughly 40 percent of national income account-
ing—a topic routinely taught in introductory economics courses in college—the eco-
nomics profession has spent decades teaching people linguistics, not economics.
the eMpeRoR’s neW clothes
For those accustomed to discussing US fiscal policy with reference to the debt 
and deficit, this observation that the debt and deficit have no clothes will come as a 
shock. Many people, broadly speaking, have themselves convinced that something 
is real when it’s not.
Some claim that official liabilities are backed by the full faith and credit of the US 
government, which is why they are official and that calling something like a claim to 
future Medicare benefits an official debt does not convey upon it the same certainty 
of receipt as does designating a government bond an official government IOU.
Unfortunately, the likelihood of the government making a particular payment, 
in cash or in kind, or collecting a certain receipt does not constitute grounds for 
7. Social Security Administration, The 2013 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age 
and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Trust Funds, Washington, DC, May 31, 2013, http://www 
.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2013/.
8. With this accounting, the Treasury bonds held in the Social Security trust fund are indeed an asset to the 
Social Security system, but they would also be recorded as additional government debt held by the public.
9. Historically, the government could have set up private pension accounts for workers, required them 
to deposit their FICA contributions to these accounts, and then borrowed these funds from the pension 
fund managers. The pension funds would have collected principal plus interest and used it to pay ben-
efits. If the benefits didn’t equal exactly what Social Security pays, the government could have provided 
the difference and called it an old age benefit.
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pinning down the labeling of that payment or receipt. Language is very flexible and 
uncertain future amounts can always be redefined to be the sum of certain amounts 
plus additional amounts that are uncertain. And the amounts that are defined to be 
certain can be labeled as official debt repayments.10
In point of fact, the repayment of official debt is highly uncertain if we are talk-
ing about economic repayment, that is, repayment in real terms, which is the only 
repayment worth discussing. Take a 30-year Treasury bond. Its real value can easily 
be wiped out by inflation. Indeed, in the 1970s, as described in the 1982 Economic 
Report of the President, the United States reneged on one-half of a trillion dollars of 
its official debt by running high inflation.11
In contrast to the highly risky payment, in real terms, of principal and interest 
on what’s labeled official debt, the payment in real terms of Social Security and 
Medicare benefits seems much more certain. Social Security benefits are formally 
indexed to inflation, and Medicare benefits are implicitly indexed to health care 
costs. Furthermore, these benefits enjoy the backing of over 50 million members of 
AARP, which is arguably the most powerful lobby in Washington.
There are many other liabilities of the government whose real payments are much 
more certain than those backed by Uncle Sam’s formal pledge to convey pieces of 
paper of unknown purchasing power, that is, green-and-yellow–colored Treasury 
checks, in the future. Take staffing our military at a minimal level. That expendi-
ture on defense is a real commitment because one can’t hire soldiers for nothing. Or 
consider the commitment to maintain our interstate highway system. The need to 
pour asphalt is a real one to which Uncle Sam makes no formal commitment because 
there is no need to reify economic necessity with words. Indeed, the purely verbal 
“full faith and credit” nominal repayment commitment extended to government 
bond repayment could and should be read as a form of false advertising—a means 
to gin up government bond purchases by those who suffer from money illusion and 
can’t distinguish nominal from real magnitudes.12
econoMics’ lAbeling pRobleM—the geneRAl RelAtivity oF 
FiscAl lAnguAge
At its core, economics’ labeling problem is similar to physics’ labeling problem. 
Einstein taught us that the mathematics of physics does not provide unique mea-
sures of time and distance. Rather there are an infinite number of such measures 
10. Suppose, for example, that the government takes $1,000 today from person X and returns either 
$1,500 or $500 a year from now. Suppose the interest rate is 10 percent. We can describe this policy as 
the government borrowing $1,000 today and the government making either a transfer payment of $400 
or levying a tax of $600 a year from now. Alternatively, we can label this policy as the government taxing 
person X $1,000 today and making a transfer payment to person X next year of either $1,500 or $500.
11. Economic Report of the President, February 1982 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982).
12. This discussion references nominal bonds, not TIPS (Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities).
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or descriptions, depending on one’s frame of reference, namely one’s direction and 
speed through space. These frames of reference can be viewed as languages just as 
a fiscal-labeling convention can be viewed as a language.
Both the math of physics and the math of economics are about real things. But the 
equations of these sciences don’t tell us what labels to attach to their variables. Nor 
do they tell us what language to use to discuss their properties and implications. In 
economics, the freedom to label—in an internally consistent manner—the fiscal vari-
ables of any and all rational models (by which I mean models in which agents aren’t 
fooled by language) is absolute. And it permits one to say that model X, which can 
be any rational model, generates time path Y of government deficits or surpluses, 
where Y can be any path one wants to announce.
Notwithstanding the words one uses to discuss model X and the associated path 
Y of deficits or surpluses, what the model’s actual fiscal policy is doing to the model’s 
economy, including the course of all its real variables, doesn’t change. Thus, a take 
as you go fiscal policy, which, over time, takes ever larger amounts of resources from 
successive young generations and transfers them to the contemporaneous old and 
drives the economy to a certain doom can be described in a zillion different ways, 
including entailing a balanced budget.
To understand this position, suppose the only policy in place is called Social 
Security and that each year the government raises Social Security’s payroll tax 
rate and hands all the payroll taxes collected in that year to the contemporaneous 
elderly, on a per capita basis, as benefits. Each year’s taxes equal each year’s transfer 
payments and the annual deficit is, therefore, zero. This “balanced budget,” “fiscally 
conservative,” “prudent” policy will eventually—given the current state of the actual 
Social Security program—produce a tax rate so high that no one will work. And, 
in the meantime, since the young will be handing over ever larger shares of their 
earnings for immediate consumption by the elderly—resources they would other-
wise have saved and invested in real capital—this policy will gradually eliminate the 
economy’s capital stock as well as its labor supply.
If one defines fiscal sustainability as running a policy that doesn’t kill the econ-
omy or as one that delivers at least a minimal living standard to future genera-
tions, this policy is clearly unsustainable. But you would never know it by consid-
ering the government’s deficit, which is always zero. However, with a different 
set of words, this policy would produce continual deficits and a debt-to-GDP ratio 
that explodes.
There is nothing, by the way, that prevents a government from changing its label-
ing conventions through time. Chile, in the early 1980s, chose to relabel its social 
security system “privatization.” This involved having Chilean workers hand mon-
ies to private pension funds that they would otherwise have given the government 
in payroll taxes. The pension funds then lent the money to the government, which 
needed the funds to pay older social security beneficiaries. Voila, erstwhile “taxes” 
were instantly being called “borrowing.”
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A number of other countries, including Hungary, Russia, Kazakhstan, and 
Argentina, followed Chile’s lead and privatized their social security retirement 
programs. While these “reforms,” like the Chilean “reform,” did entail some real as 
opposed to exclusively linguistic changes, they were primarily labeling reforms.13 
In recent years, Hungary, Russia, and Argentina have un-privatized their social 
security systems, either fully or partially, in yet another primarily linguistic policy 
“reform” in order to raise “taxes.”
the FiscAl gAp And geneRAtionAl Accounting—lAnguAge-
invARiAnt MeAsuRes oF FiscAl sustAinAbility
Assessing fiscal sustainability necessitates using measures that are language 
invariant. The fiscal gap has this property. No matter what internally consistent 
labeling convention one uses, the fiscal gap will remain the same. The infinite-
horizon fiscal gap is language invariant for a simple reason. It puts everything on 
the books.
The sole requirement for a language-invariant assessment is that all government 
expenditures and receipts, through the infinite horizon, be calculated as present 
value in forming the fiscal gap. Considering expenditures and receipts out to the 
infinite horizon is critical. Any finite-horizon fiscal gap will produce another label-
dependent fiscal indicator.
The 75-year US fiscal gap is only 40 percent of the true $205 trillion fiscal gap. 
With different labels than those used by Uncle Sam, the 75-year fiscal gap could be 
smaller or larger than the true fiscal gap.
Generational accounting also produces language-invariant measures of fiscal 
sustainability. It shows three things: (1) how much future generations will need to 
pay in taxes net of transfer payments received if they are left, on their own, to cover 
the fiscal gap; (2) how lifetime net tax rates differ across generations; and (3) how 
changes in policy change the remaining lifetime net taxes facing different living 
generations.
The “balanced budget” policy just described would produce no fiscal gap since 
taxes equal spending year by year. But under that policy, successive generations face 
higher lifetime net tax rates defined as the present value at the time of their birth of 
taxes net of transfer payments received in each future year, all divided by the pres-
ent value of lifetime pre-tax labor earnings. In other words, the lifetime net tax rate 
shows what share of their lifetime resources members of a given generation will, on 
average and on net, hand over to the government over their lifetimes.
13. Arguing, as some do, that the Chilean reform permitted workers to earn higher returns on their sav-
ings fails to adjust for the risk of investing in equities and other higher-return assets. The fact that priva-
tization of social security puts workers into the stock market does not imply that the “policy” represents 
anything other than a relabeling of existing policy.
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hoW did the us FiscAl gAp get so big?
The federal government has spent the last six decades producing its fiscal gap. 
Every administration has taken money from young workers, called that money 
“taxes,” handed much of it over to older generations in the form of Social Security 
and Medicare and Medicaid benefits, and then placated the young workers by 
promising them even larger benefits when they retired. These promises were kept 
off the books because of the use of the word “taxes.” To repeat, had the govern-
ment labeled the taking from the young as “borrowing,” much more of the fiscal 
gap would now be showing up in the form of official debt. But the fact that only $1 
in $20 has been so classified is testimony to the ability of politicians to keep their 
promises off the books.
In contrast to the measurement of the official debt, which is a matter of linguistics 
and has no real basis in economics, the fiscal gap is invariant to labeling conventions. 
It doesn’t matter what is put on the books and what is kept off the books for one very 
simple reason. The fiscal gap adds together both off-the-books and on-the-books 
liabilities, that is, it leaves neither out and treats both symmetrically. It also includes 
all on-the-books and off-the-books assets, most of which consist of projected tax 
receipts in the future.
Unfortunately, the CBO didn’t begin providing reliable long-term fiscal projec-
tions until 2003, so establishing the fiscal gap before then is not feasible. But figure 
1 shows the fiscal gap from 2003 through 2013. It records a huge increase from $60 
trillion in 2003 to over $175 trillion at the end of President George W. Bush’s term by 
2008. The growth in the fiscal gap reflects the Bush administration’s major tax cuts, 
the sharply larger spending on defense and entitlement programs, and the failure to 
cover even interest on the fiscal gap.
But in President Obama’s first term, the gap also rose dramatically, as indicated in 
figure 1. This increase reflects the fiscal impact of the Great Recession; the ever closer 
retirement of the baby boomers; the failure to reform Social Security, Medicare, or 
Medicaid; the introduction of the Affordable Care Act’s health exchanges; and the 
heavy cost of our two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 2013 tax hikes and budget-
ary sequestration represent significant policy changes. They shaved $17 trillion, in 
present value, off the fiscal gap, which is not an everyday event. But it’s still a drop 
in the bucket relative to what’s needed to eliminate the $205 trillion fiscal gap.
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Table 1. Fiscal Gap as percenTaGe oF The 
presenT Value oF GDp









Note: The US fiscal gap is very large compared to that of other 
developed countries. Many countries, such as Italy and Greece, 
have relatively large official debts but have smaller implicit debts 
due to pension reforms and cost controls on government spending 
for health care.
Source: Author’s calculations and assessments.
FiGure 1. us Fiscal Gap in Trillions oF Dollars, 2003–2013
* Missing bars reflect the unavailability of the Congressional Budget Office’s fiscal projections for those years.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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closing AMeRicA’s FiscAl gAp
Coming up with the 10.3 percent of GDP, year in and year out, that is needed to 
smoothly close the fiscal gap is a tall fiscal order. To do so via spending cuts alone 
requires an immediate and permanent 37 percent cut in all noninterest spending. To 
do so via tax hikes alone requires an immediate and permanent 57 percent increase 
in all federal taxes.
As table 2 shows, the longer Congress waits to either raise taxes or cut spend-
ing, the larger the adjustments that will be needed to eliminate the fiscal gap. For 
example, waiting until 2043 to begin raising taxes will require, starting at that time, 
a 75.9 percent permanent tax hike. And waiting until that point to make cuts in all 
spending, apart from debt service, will require a 46.3 percent permanent cut.
Table 2. percenTaGe reVenue increases or spenDinG cuTs neeDeD  
To eliminaTe Fiscal Gap For DiFFerenT aDjusTmenT sTarTinG Years
Start year
Revenue increase  
(percentage)








Table 3 presents US generational accounts for 2013. It shows that, except for people 
in their twenties and early thirties, all currently living cohorts are on the receiving 
end of the government’s largess. Their projected receipt of transfers exceeds their 
projected tax payments, with the generational accounts displaying the remaining life-
time tax payments net of transfer payments received, all discounted to the present.
Generational accounting calculates what future generations must pay over their 
lifetimes, assuming that each future generation’s lifetime net tax payment rises in 
proportion to its labor earnings and that future generations collectively are required 
to cover the fiscal gap. Stated differently, people born in the future are assigned 
higher absolute lifetime net tax payments such that their lifetime net tax rate—the 
ratio of their lifetime net tax payment to their lifetime labor earnings—is the same 
regardless of when they are born.
The table’s next to last row shows the absolute lifetime net tax payment facing 
those born next year under this scenario. The birthday present Uncle Sam will hand 
those born next year is a $420,600 net lifetime tax bill, which is $479,900 more than 
the net lifetime tax bill today’s newborn is facing under current policy. These figures 
indicate an absolutely massive imbalance in the implied treatment of those now 
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alive and our unborn children if the entire fiscal gap is spread over everyone coming 
in the future in proportion to their earnings capacity; that is, the $420,600 would 
grow with labor productivity. Expecting future generations to pay vastly more than 
those now alive is not just generationally immoral, it’s also economically infeasible. 
It would require hitting up future generations for, on average, roughly 60 cents of 
every dollar they earn in taxes net of transfers received.
Table 3. 2013 us GeneraTional accounTs























Difference between future generations  
and current newborns
$479.9
Source: Calculations by the author and Giovanni Callegari. 
Merc atus center at GeorGe M a son univer sit y
16
WhAt do We ReAlly MeAn by FiscAl sustAinAbility?
As Herb Stein, former chair of President Nixon’s Council of Economic Advisors, 
used to say, “If something can’t go on forever, it will stop.” This was a terribly 
unfortunate remark, which has been paraphrased innumerable times by those who 
appear to think that when unsustainable policy is changed will have no impact on 
what the new policy must be or what the state of the economy, particularly the size 
of the capital stock, will be. But as any decent fiscal simulation model will show, 
that’s not the case. What Stein should have said is that “Policies that can’t go on will 
stop too late.”
The United States is clearly running a fiscally unsustainable policy. Its fiscal gap 
is enormous and will require massive tax hikes or spending cuts (or both) far beyond 
anything the American public imagines, with the size of these adjustments rising 
the longer they are put off.
This said, the fiscal gap simply tells us whether the government will come up 
short in trying to pay its bills. It doesn’t tell us whether those being handed its 
unpaid bills will face lifetime tax rates that are beyond their capacities to pay. Nor 
does it tell us how the economy has reacted or will react to the policy being run.
Consequently, the fiscal gap by itself can’t tell us everything we need to know 
about fiscal sustainability. Ultimately, we need to assess fiscal sustainability in terms 
of a policy’s impact on successive future generations—both the direct impact on 
their lifetime net tax rates, as measured by generational accounting, and the indirect 
impact on their earning capacity.
us FiscAl policy’s iMpAct on sAving, investMent, And ReAl 
WAge gRoWth
As figure 2 shows, the United States has experienced gradual, if not steady, declines 
in its rates of net national saving and net domestic investment as a percentage of 
national income since 1950. Last year’s net national saving rate was just 2 percent, 
and the net domestic investment rate was just 4 percent. These rates were both 14 
percent in 1950.
The life cycle model of saving tells us that the young are savers and the old are 
spenders. Why? Because the young need to save for their retirement, and the old are 
focused on spending their remaining resources over their relatively few remaining 
years. The life cycle model predicts that taking from young savers and giving to old 
spenders will reduce national saving as well as domestic investment, assuming for-
eign investors don’t fully make up the difference.
What the life cycle model predicts is what we see in the US data over time. The 
decline in the US saving rate can be directly traced, not to a dramatically higher rate 
of government consumption as a share of national income, but to a dramatically 
higher rate of household consumption. The question then is who has been consum-
ing so much more? The answer is the elderly.
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FiGure 2. neT naTional saVinG raTe anD neT DomesTic inVesTmenT raTe,  
1950–2012
Source: National Income and Product Accounts, US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Source: Ronald Lee, “Macroeconomic Implications of Demographic Change: A Global Perspective,” presentation for BOJ-
IMES Conference “Demographic Changes and Macroeconomic Performance,” Tokyo, May 2012, p. 14, http://www.nt 
accounts.org/doc/repository/Ron%20Lee%20BOJ%20presentation%20May30-2012.pdf.
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Source:  US  National  Transfer  Accounts,  Lee,  Donehower  and  Miller,  
2011  
FiGure 3. us consumpTion per capiTa bY aGe, 1960, 1981, anD 2007
(raTio To aVeraGe labor income, aGes 30–49)
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Consider figures 3 and 4. The first shows a dramatic increase in the relative con-
sumption by the elderly compared to younger generations. The second shows a 
dramatic increase over time in per capita Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid 
benefits paid to the elderly relative to per capita GDP.
FiGure 4. us real YearlY social securiTY, meDicare, anD meDicaiD beneFiTs per 
elDerlY person anD real per capiTa GDp, 1970–2010
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Congressional Budget Office and the US Census Bureau.
These transfers to the elderly don’t encompass all the postwar redistribution to 
the elderly. There have been periodic tax cuts as well as a shift in the structure of 
taxation away from capital income toward wages. These factors also produced a 
major transfer of resources to the elderly and away from the young.
Another policy that has encouraged the elderly to spend at a higher rate is the 
annuitization of their resources via the Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid pro-
grams (70 percent of whose benefits are paid to the elderly). These programs provide 
payments, not in a one-time lump sum, but on an ongoing, inflation-protected basis 
for as long as the elderly recipient lives. As a result, much of the fear of spending 
and thereby outliving one’s resources is removed. So too is the fear of losing one’s 
resources in volatile asset markets or via inflation.
The life cycle model also predicts that declines in rates of domestic investment 
will reduce the growth rate of real wages. In the United States there are many causes 
for low real median wage growth. One can point to outsourcing, competition from 
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foreign workers, a loss of comparative advantage in manufacturing, worsening 
 primary and secondary education, increasing wage inequality, and competition 
from smart machines. But having less capital with which to work than would other-
wise be the case is surely part of the explanation for stagnant real US wages. Indeed, 
some of the wage statistics are quite astounding. For example, real take home pay 
per hour per US worker is essentially the same today as it was in the mid-1960s.
The fact that US fiscal policies appear to be seriously affecting the economy 
means that analysis of the sustainability of our current policies should take into 
account these feedback (general equilibrium) effects. If the economy is damaged, 
the ability of the government to sustain its fiscal policies will be diminished, and the 
injury to future generations will be exacerbated. Again, if the ultimate desiderata 
for moving from one policy to another is the extent of the damage it causes future 
generations, then the damage to the economy needs to be factored into the analysis 
as discussed in my paper with Hans Fehr.14
chAllenges to FiscAl gAp And geneRAtionAl Accounting
Fiscal gap and generational accounting pose well-defined economic questions 
whose answers don’t yet depend on labeling conventions. But this doesn’t make 
either fiscal gap or generational accounting easy to implement. The greatest chal-
lenge in conducting these analyses is valuing, in the present, future receipts and 
payments, each dollar of which comes with particular risks.
Economists are working on how this risk-adjusted discounting should be done, 
but they don’t have clear-cut answers.15 In the meantime, the discounting, in the 
case of the United States, has been done using the government’s preferred 3 per-
cent real discount rate. A higher discount rate would certainly reduce the size of 
the fiscal gap, but also reduce the present value of GDP with which it is compared, 
making the requisite policy adjustment needed to close the gap much less sensi-
tive. For example, using a 5 percent real discount rate reduces the fiscal gap to $52 
trillion. But as a share of the present value of GDP, the fiscal gap is still enormous 
at 8 percent.
The techniques for valuation that are being developed assume the existence of 
financial markets that are sufficiently complete that they can be used to value taxes 
or transfer payments coming down the road. But this is a strong assumption since 
there are a very large number of states the economy can occupy in the future.
14. Hans Fehr and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, “Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium,” 
FinanzArchiv, Neue Folge, Band 53, Heft 1 (1996/1997): 1–27.
15. See, for example, Alexander W. Blocker, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, and Stephen A. Ross, “The True Cost 
of Social Security” (NBER Working Paper No. 14427, National Bureau of Economic Research, October 
2008); and John Geanakoplos and Stephen P. Zeldes, “The Market Value of Social Security” (working 
paper, July 11, 2011), http://www1.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/4590/gz_mkt 
_val_ssec_7_11_11.pdf.
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A complete market, called a complete contingent claims market, would permit 
one to buy or sell today arbitrary amounts of real purchasing power in each future 
state. With such a market it would be easy to do fiscal gap and generational account-
ing. For example, to value $20,000 (in today’s dollars) of benefits promised by the 
government to Joe Smith in state X 20 years from now, one would just need to 
consult the financial pages to see what such a claim would sell for if one bought it 
today in the market.
The problem is that our prevailing financial products and instruments appear to 
be far fewer in number than the number of future states the economy can occupy. 
This puts economists in the position of trying to put a price on things that aren’t 
normally for sale. Doing so requires constructing large-scale computable general 
equilibrium life-cycle simulation models, with aggregate as well as individual spe-
cific shocks (risks), that take into account the incompleteness of markets. Within 
such a model, one can calculate the value today to any given economic agent in the 
model of making payments to or receiving payments from the government in any 
given future state. Such models are now being built based on recent breakthroughs 
in numerical computation. They should soon provide a better basis for risk adjust-
ing the tax and transfer payment flows in fiscal gap and generational accounting.16
These new models can also be used to produce a different measure of fiscal 
sustainability. Specifically, they can be simulated to show the average time left 
before the welfare of future generations falls below a critical level. Such intergen-
erational Monte Carlo studies can eventually replace fiscal gap and generational 
accounting as the means of studying the implications of maintaining policies that 
damage our posterity.
the inFoRM Act
Getting Washington to do proper long-term fiscal accounting is no easy trick. 
In the last year of President George H. W. Bush’s administration and the first year 
of President Clinton’s, the President’s Budget included fiscal gap and generational 
accounting analyses prepared by the Office of Management and Budget with the 
assistance of myself, current U.C. Berkeley economist Alan Auerbach, and current 
Cato Institute economist Jagadeesh Gokhale.
Although the analysis was buried deep within the appendix to the President’s 
Budget, it received considerable press attention. Indeed, Ross Perot used the 1992 
analysis in his first run for the presidency.17
16. Jasmina Hasanhodzic and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, “Generational Risk—Is It a Big Deal? Simulating an 
80-Period OLG Model with Aggregate Shocks” (NBER Working Paper No. 19179, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, June 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19179.
17. Keith Bradsher, “Large Tax Burden Is Seen for Young,” New York Times, February 9, 1994, http://
www.nytimes.com/1994/02/09/us/large-tax-burden-is-seen-for-young.html.
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In the second year of President Clinton’s first term, the analysis was censored two 
days before the President’s Budget was published, notwithstanding months of work 
on the analysis by myself, Auerbach, and Gokhale, as well as top staff at the Office 
of Management and Budget.
Although official deficits declined while President Clinton was in office, the fis-
cal gap continued to grow, thanks in good part to a more than a 20 percent increase 
in Medicare and Medicaid spending as a share of GDP during Clinton’s eight years 
in office. This entailed permanent benefit hikes, not just for contemporaneous 
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, but for all future beneficiaries, including the 
78 million baby boomers now starting to retire.
In the first term of President George W. Bush’s administration, Treasury 
Secretary Paul O’Neill decided to reintroduce fiscal gap accounting to the presi-
dent’s budget. He chose current University of Pennsylvania economist Kent 
Smetters to head up a team that included Jagadeesh Gokhale to prepare this analy-
sis. The team spent the better part of 2002 completing its task. But on December 
7, 2002, Secretary O’Neill was fired. Publishing the fiscal gap might have seriously 
undermined the chances for passage of Medicare Part D, with its undisclosed $15 
trillion at present-value cost. Sure enough, two days after O’Neill’s firing, the fiscal 
gap analysis was dropped.
The lesson to be drawn here and from the 17 to 1 ratio of the fiscal gap to the offi-
cial debt is that our politicians like to keep most of the debts they leave us and our 
children off the books. They will continue to do so until the public demands they 
disclose the truth.
The Inform Act, which stands for The Intergenerational Financial Obligations 
Reform Act, is a bipartisan bill recently introduced in the Senate by senators Kaine 
(D-VA) and Thune (R-SD). Senators Coons (D-DE) and Portman (R-OH) have 
cosponsored the bill. In the House, the legislation was introduced by representa-
tives Cooper (D-TN) and Schock (R-IL). This act, detailed at www.theinformact 
.org, would require the Congressional Budget Office, the Government Accountability 
Office, and the Office of Management and Budget to prepare annual fiscal gap and 
generational accounting analyses and also, upon a request by Congress, to do such 
analyses for major pending fiscal legislation.
To date, 12 Nobel laureates, more than 700 additional economists, and thousands 
of other Americans have endorsed the bill, including many prominent business lead-
ers and distinguished former government officials, most notably George Shultz, who 
served as OMB director, secretary of the Treasury, and secretary of state.18
18. See the full-page ad with endorsements that appeared on page 9 of the print version of the New York 
Times, October 22, 2013.
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conclusion
The United States has spent decades playing take as you go, in which each gen-
eration of elderly takes from the young while promising the young their turn when 
old to expropriate from their own children. I consider this a Ponzi scheme, or chain 
letter if you’d prefer, that has been organized by Uncle Sam in such a way that each 
new generation of retirees can claim to be entitled to the off-the-books benefits that 
they have been promised. Economists, as a group, have been complicit in this decep-
tion. They knew or should have known that the standard fiscal indicator of the fiscal 
burden being left to our children—the official debt—is a number in search of a con-
cept, a linguistic construct totally devoid of economic content. But like the tailors 
in “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” they went along to get along, in this case with the 
measures that the politicians, media, and general public thought they understood 
and wanted to talk about.
But things have changed. Today the economics profession is speaking with 
almost one voice, proclaiming that conventional fiscal accounting needs to be sup-
plemented with, if not totally replaced by, fiscal gap and generational accounting. 
The over 700 economists who have endorsed the Inform Act at www.theinform 
act.org include a veritable Who’s Who of economists when it comes to academic 
achievement. All those who have endorsed the bill and all those who will do so in 
the coming months get the point that misleading, fallacious fiscal accounting, which 
is not worthy of even Enron or Bernie Madoff, must end.
Fiscal gap and generational accounting are not perfect measures of fiscal sustain-
ability, and their implementation remains challenging. But they do put everything 
on the books and provide at least a rough answer to the right question rather than a 
precise answer to the wrong question. They will permit us to adopt policies, such as 
those laid out at www.thepurpleplans.org, that can close the fiscal gap in a genera-
tionally fair manner without pulling the rug out from under anyone.
